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New technology played a dramatic role in U.S. contributions to
allied success in World War II. In many cases, e.g., atomic weapons,
penicillin, radar and DDT, these technologies were based on science not
applied before the war. Scientists led many of the triumphant efforts.
After the war, the prestige of science was great enough that national
expenditures for research grew from earlier charity levels to budgets that
are now noticeable in the federal deficit. This investment led to a golden
age of science-based technology that has enriched the world. It has also
permanently altered science.
The money was used to exponentially increase the numbers of
educated scientists. It was also used to build an industry that makes
scientific apparatus so powerful that, without the latest and most
expensive versions, it is difficult to advance. Research careers are
critically dependent on success in raising funds to support graduate
students and buy equipment.
The power of science to influence policy has not grown as fast as its
need for funds. As funding has tightened, institutions of science have
become fixated on the federal research budget. Frank Press called
raising money for basic research "the most important activity I can
undertake as president of the National Academy of Sciences." 1 Thus,
Professor of Engineering, Thayer School, Dartmouth College; founder and
former Chair and Chief Executive Officer of Avco Everett Research Laboratory. Dr.
Kantrowitz received his degrees (Physics) from Columbia University. He is a
member of the National Academy of Sciences as well as the National Academy of
Engineering.
1 Frank Press, Letter to Members, April 1984, at 9.
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institutions of science expend less of their precious political influence on
tasks that do not serve the funding imperative and fail to take bold
stands against the pseudoscience of our times.
And Society
Statements of preference for a policy express inner values and
perceived facts. People can be persuaded to change preferences by
altering their values or by changing their perception of pertinent facts. In
modem society, pertinent facts have become increasingly inaccessible to
the "naked eye." As scientific facts become more important in public
policy, democracy has become more dependent on scientists for factual
information. This vulnerability has made publicizing tortured versions
of facts a favorite tactic for influencing policy.
The situation was eloquently summed up by Margaret Mead in
1976:2
We need a new institution. There isn't any doubt about
that. The institutions we have are totally unsatisfactory. In
many cases they are not only unsatisfactory, they involve a
prostitution of the decision making process.
To oversimplify somewhat, let us characterize two modes of finding
facts as the "elitist" approach and the "checks and balances" approach.
We have always lived with the elitist approach. There can be no doubt
that, if the spokesmen for science were viewed as sufficiently wise and
saintly, their findings would be clearly seen as the best obtainable.
However, when anyone can gain by attacking or ignoring the
wisdom or the saintliness of the spokesmen for science, we must expect
alternate factual statements to become surrogates for value differences in
political controversy. Alternate factual statements are calculated to appeal
to people who cannot be persuaded to share the values of their
proponents. When the public is presented with such statements, the
"Which scientist do you believe?" dilemma results in the resolution of
scientific controversies external to the scientific community.
This paper describes a proposed methodology for communicating
what science knows and especially what science doesn't know when
scientific facts are needed for public policy decision making, one based
2 PROCEEDINGS OFTHE COLLOQUIUM ONTHE SCIENCE COURT 25(1977).
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on a norm for communicating with the public intended to be enforced by
the scientific community. It also describes efforts to advance the
positions that: (1) the scientific community has a duty to minimize the
political efficacy of external controversy concerning scientific facts and
(2) by extending to public statements, the checks and balances
traditionally used to police communication within the community,
resolution internal to that community can be more persuasive and
effective in discouraging external absurdities.
The Elitist Approach
The elitist approach was perhaps best described by Philip Handler,
past president of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), who was
quoted as saying,3 "if what we have to say is credible, the credibility
rests on the distinction and prestige of the members."
Handler led a valiant effort by the NAS to implement this approach.
In addressing the NAS Bicentennial Symposium, he reported the results
as follows: 4
But establishing truth with respect to technical
controversy relevant to matters of public policy, and to do so
in full public view, has proved to be a surprisingly difficult
challenge to the scientific community. To our simple code
must be added one more canon: when describing
technological risks to the non-scientific public, the scientist
must be as honest, objective, and dispassionate as he knows
he must be in the more conventional, time-honored self-
policing scientific endeavor. This additional canon has not
always been observed. Witness the chaos that has come with
challenges to the use of nuclear power in several countries.
Witness, in this country, the cacophony of charge and
counter-charge concerning the safety of diverse food
additives, pesticides and drugs. We have learned that the
scientist-advocate, on either side of such a debate, is likely to
be more advocate than scientist and this has unfavorably
altered the public view of both the nature of the scientific
3 Philip Handler, Interview, EPRI Journal, April 1980, at 33.
4 Phillip Handler, Science and Hope in SCIENCE: ARESOURCE FORHUMANKIND,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES BICEnTNAL SYMPOSIUM,
12 (1976).
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endeavor and the personal attributes of scientists. In turn,
that has given yet a greater sense of urgency to the public
demand for assurance that the risks attendant upon the uses
of technology be appraised and minimized. And what a huge
task that is!
Three examples of the current retreat toward a "risk free" society
illustrate Handler's point.
1. Abandoning expansion of nuclear energy in 1978 (before Three
Mile Island), the U.S. has now fallen behind most of the industrial
world in its utilization.
2. The social beneficence of innovation has been so discredited that
our courts have, since the sixties, adopted the doctrine of "strict
liability."' 5 It puts the whole burden of potential harm on innovators
even when they are innocent of any negligence. Reflecting today's
search for a risk free society, strict liability implements the assessment
that innovation benefits only innovators, so they must bear the whole
burden of risks, putting U.S. innovators at a competitive disadvantage.
3. A recent comparison of U.S. practices with those of other
industrial countries in the approval of new drugs for marketing
illustrates the damage consequent on risk avoidance. 6 The Food and
Drug Administration approved 55 new chemical entities for marketing in
1987, 1988 and 1989. Eighty percent of these were available in foreign
markets, a mean time of 6.5 years before U.S. approval.
The weaknesses of an elitist approach have led to checks and
balances external to the scientific community. Thus, Congress has felt a
need for "independent" fact finding. It set up the Office of Technological
Assessment independent of the executive branch but without safeguards
to protect it from political control. Similarly, any political group (and its
opposition) in need of "scientific" support to influence public opinion
has little difficulty in recruiting lists of names that seem authoritative. In
the resulting media contest between competing authorities, it is not
possible to tell whether science or politics is speaking. We then lose
both the power of science and the credibility of democratic process.
5 PETER W. HUBER, LIABI~nTY, ch. 3 (1988).
6 Kaitin, DiCerbo & Lasagna, The New Drug Approvals of 1987, 1988, and
1989, 31 1. COLN. PKARMAcoL 116 (1991).
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The noise introduced by the activities of "Madison Avenue" and of
"Hollywood" has degraded communication enough to seriously threaten
our ability to undertake new adventures in science-based technology.
When your auto windshield is splattered with mud, obscuring the road
ahead, you stop.
Distinguished economists such as Paul Krugman have great
difficulty accounting for the decline in U.S. productivity growth in the
last two decades. He reports that "Even among the experts,... stagnant
American productivity is not a fashionable topic.... Why did it happen?
And what can we do about it? The answer to both is the same: We don't
know."7
These are the same decades in which the U.S. set out to minimize
risks due to new science-based technology. This period has seen a
decline in the traditional expectation that Americans have always had that
their children would lead better lives.
I will not pretend to understand all causes of this decline. However,
I believe that it is incumbent on the scientific community to reexamine its
procedures for communicating what it knows, and especially what it
does not know, to the public when controversial scientific -facts have a
bearing on the making of public policy. This is precisely the area that
Handler characterized as "a huge task." It is necessary that we face this
task before America can restore its confidence in the adventure of
science-based technology. It is of course not sufficient because no
signal the community can send can overcome the noise that can be
introduced by "Madison Avenue" and "Hollywood." After we have
faced up to our duty in reducing what Handler called "cacophony," we
can more confidently call on the media to do their part.
The Internal Checks and Balances Approach
The scientific community has its traditions that provide a kind of due
process in what Handler called "the more conventional, time-honored,
self-policing, scientific endeavor." What is needed is to extend these
procedures to provide information basic to policy making in a way that
the policy maker, the scientist and the average citizen will find more
7 PAUL R.KRUGMAN, THE AGE OF DMINISHED EXPECrAnONS, 13 (1990).
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credible than alternate sources. To achieve this end, I propose that the
"one more canon" should be:
Any scientist who addresses the public or lay officials
on scientific facts bearing on public policy matters should
stand ready to publicly answer questions not only from the
public, but from expert adversaries in the scientific
community.
This norm is to be enforced by the scientific community.
The proposal to create an Institution for Scientific Judgment was an
attempt to institutionalize this norm. 8 It contrasts with elitist
approaches in the same way that a "government of laws" contrasts with
a "government of men."
Today, scientists can sign petitions or take positions in committee
votes consistent with their politics without having to concern themselves
with being challenged on their knowledge of the science or technology
basic to their positions. They can advance policies they favor that may
involve science far from their expertise. This is a "government of men."
The prospect of embarrassment, by being under obligation to
publicly answer questions from expert adversaries, would reduce the
noise. Perhaps then we would be able to hear the voices of those who
know most about the science. Perhaps then we would know "which
scientist to believe."
It need hardly be stated that the success of any such institution
would depend on the wisdom and the saintliness of its members.
However, it will gain credibility because the public will recognize that it
embodies some of the elements that our society has developed for
dealing with controversy. It would have some of the attributes of a
"government of laws."
Efforts to Institutionalize the Norm
During early efforts, the name "Science Court" (SC) was attached to
this concept as the media's recognition of the fact that there are some
8 Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156
Scf NcE 763 (1967). See also, Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on
Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology, The Science Court Experiment:
An Interim Report, reprinted infra, at 179.
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parallels between the norms of scientific controversy and legal due
process. The name has stuck, and we will continue to use it. This makes
it important to point out that there are many salient differences, e.g.:
1. Courts concern themselves with both finding facts and
pronouncing verdicts, i.e., expressing society's values. The SC would
deal with facts only and would not recommend actions or policies.
2. All science is tentative. Therefore any output from the SC would
be offered as the state of knowledge at a time when that was needed for
action. In controversial situations, we would expect early obsolescence
as new knowledge was generated.
3. Important differences between scientific and legal mores have
been noted whenever these cultures interact. In the SC, it is proposed
that the mores of the scientific community be enforced. Ad hominem
attacks are unacceptable in scientific debate.
4. Following well known philosopher, Sir Karl Popper,
nonfalsifiable statements are not part of science and do not share the
credibility that scientific statements earn by surviving varied refutation
attempts. Nonfalsifiable statements (e.g. recommendations for action)
will not be part of SC reports.
The Science Court Task Force
In the mid 1970's the SC attracted considerable support. President
Ford had appointed a Scientific Advisory Group restoring the advisory
function that President Nixon had abolished. This group appointed a
task force (that I chaired) to examine the SC and to propose action. In an
Interim Report the task force proposed "a series of experiments to
develop adversary proceedings and test their value in resolving
questions of scientific fact." It outlined initial procedures and anticipated
the need for a number of experiments before a persuasive procedure
could be developed.
The Task Force proposed conducting a colloquium to give
proponents and opponents an opportunity to state and debate their
positions. A second objective was to give people who had been active in
scientific controversy an opportunity to "criticize and develop the rules
of procedure ...." The proponents were members of the Task Force.
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The Scientists Institute for Public Information had vigorously
opposed the SC. Margaret Mead and Alan McGowan, chair and
president of the Institute, accepted invitations to present their views to
the colloquium. However, Mead gave the matter more thought. By the
time of her talk, she expressed the need for a new institution, as quoted
above. She objected to the notion that one side might "win" in a SC
procedure and also feared that, in time, this procedure like all social
inventions would be corrupted. McGowan expressed fears that the SC
might result in cutting off further research. That fear was inspired by the
use of the word, "Court." Task force acceptance of the media term,
"Science Court," was a mistake and has sadly led to much confusion.
Science Court Experiments
Efforts to begin developing a more credible procedure started with
an attempt to persuade the federal government to sponsor experimental
procedures. It was not hard to persuade presidential campaigns9 to
promise such developments. However it was not found possible to get
elected officials interested in developing an institution intended to limit
their flexibility to state the scientific facts as they wanted them stated.
At a public meeting of President Ford's advisory group in 1976,
Philip Handler expressed a willingness to have the NAS host the
experimental adversary procedures. Meetings were held, but in the end
it was decided that these experiments would not fit the academy
structure.
It gradually became clear that although both sides of the Washington
politics-science complex would give lip service to the need for new
procedures, they were unwilling to aid in creating an institution that
might not be easy to control. I gradually came to understand that, when
undertaking to change a "government of men" to a "government of
laws," you must expect "men" to resist.
9 Ford and Carter statements are reproduced in C&E News, Oct. 18, 1976, at 28;
Reagan's endorsement appears in Physics Today, October 1980, at 50.
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University-Based Scientific Adversary Procedures
Such efforts have been much more welcome on university campuses
where they have a number of advantages. Scientific Adversary
Experiments (SAE), i.e., experiments intended to begin the
development of effective procedures have been conducted at U.C.
Berkeley (on Love Canal) and at Dartmouth (on SDI) and are more fully
described elsewhere. 10 Also, a record of the Dartmouth Proceedings is
available. 11
The development of Scientific Adversary Procedures (growing out
of SAE) to a point of general utility is a substantial undertaking. It will
be necessary to develop procedures that are not only acceptable to all
parties but also exhaustive enough to lead to a statement of current
knowledge adequate for the needs of policy makers. Time and resources
required for such a comprehensive statement would be comparable with
or larger than those needed for current committee procedures. In the
SAE reported below, time and resource limitations prevented any
attempt at full statements of current knowledge.
Mediation Results
The most striking output from these procedures has been the degree
of agreement that could be achieved between the scientist-advocates on
the scientific facts. Preceding the scheduled public cross examination,
the advocates were invited to make factual statements basic to their
positions. It was almost always found that adversaries were in
substantial agreement so that an agreed upon statement could easily be
negotiated. In the Love Canal case, these agreements were not recorded.
However, it was apparent that areas of disagreement selected for cross
examination were far less important than advocates' previous positions
had led us to expect.
'0 Roger Masters & Arthur Kantrowitz, Scientific Adversary Procedures: The SDI
Experiments at Dartmouth in TECHNOLOGY AD POLrrICS (Michael Kraft and Norman
Vig eds. 1988).
11 The record of the first and second Dartmouth Scientific Adversary Experiments (2
vols. 1985), available ($5.00) from Thayer School, Dartmouth College, Hanover,
NH 03755.
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Therefore in the Dartmouth proceedings, care was taken to carefully
negotiate agreed propositions. These were so far reaching that very little
serious disagreement remained for the scheduled cross examinations. 12
It is worth noting that in areas where secrecy precluded cross
examination, the advocates reported that disagreements on the scientific
facts still persisted. The contrast between open matters (under the threat
of public cross examination) in which apparent disagreements were
quickly dispelled and secret matters (where no such threat existed),
confirms our faith in this method.
These procedures served to emphasize an important limitation
secrets cannot be dealt with in open procedures. When authorities
support opposing interpretations of secret information, we are
constrained to depend on faith in the saintliness and the wisdom of the
authorities. The history of the damage done to the U.S. by
governmental secrecy has not inspired that faith. Governmental secrecy
and democracy are polar concepts.
Scientist-Advocates
It will also be necessary, as Mead pointed out at the colloquium, to
develop the profession of scientist-advocate with a cadre of people
skilled in the use of procedure to exhibit facts that support their point of
view. We need skilled scientists who know the weaknesses in an
opponent's position and are prepared to ask illuminating questions.
I began to appreciate the lack of this cadre in the early 1970's when
Congress asked the NAS to examine auto industry claims concerning
the availability of technology that would enable them to meet the
emission standards set in 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act.
Handier had proposed that the academy answer this thorny question by
a "Science Court" procedure, and I was appointed to the NAS
committee that was to supervise this bold undertaking. We quickly
discovered that all the leading academic scientists involved in emissions
technology had their research supported by the auto companies. They
told the committee that asking their sponsors the probing questions we
12 Masters & Kantrowitz, supra note 10, Appendix.
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needed answered would destroy their research support. (The committee
was rescued by Honda which, by producing the Civic, demonstrated
that the technology was indeed available.)
Another example of the problems created by the lack of such a
trained cadre is to be found in the current debate about "Global
Warming." Federal and international funding for climate modeling is
largely dependent on media attention. Professional climate modelers
asking penetrating questions that would attempt to bring unnoticed
weaknesses in current models to public attention are needed to test the
claims of the modelers. Yet, before we can realistically expect to satisfy
this need, we need a reward system (such as we have for whistle
blowers) to compensate scientist-advocates for the damage done to their
careers in uncovering information that might reduce funding for the
whole field.
Self interest of scientists or their sponsors frequently favors one side
of a public policy controversy. It is important to recognize that, today,
the careers of all scientists are affected by public perceptions of their
fields of activity. If the existence of this self interest is not publicized
and balanced, it can greatly contribute to the noise level in the
communication of scientific information.
Conclusions
Scientists attempting to influence public perception of what science
knows or doesn't know should honor the self-policing norm that
enables effective communication between scientists - namely they
should stand ready to publicly answer the questions of expert
adversaries. This paper reviews experiments with procedures based on
the interaction between scientific adversaries in public policy disputes.
It was found that apparent factual disagreements between scientists
prominent in public debates on policy issues could be dramatically
reduced when they faced the prospect of public cross examination.
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